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Abstract
When society maintains a competitive system to promote an abstract goal, competition
by necessity relies on imperfect proxy measures. For instance profit is used to measure
value to consumers, patient volumes to measure hospital performance, or the Journal
Impact Factor to measure scientific value. Here we note that any proxy measure in a
competitive societal system becomes a target for the competitors, promoting corruption
of the measure. This suggests a general applicability of what is best known as
Campbell’s or Goodhart’s Law. Indeed, prominent voices have argued that the scientific
reproducibility crisis, the financial crisis of 2008, and inaction to the threat of global
warming represent instances of such competition-induced corruption. Moreover,
competing individuals often report that competitive pressures limit their ability to act
according to the societal goal. This suggests some kind of lock-in, i.e. a powerful
mechanism locking the system into a certain subset of possible outcomes. However,
despite the profound implications, we lack a coherent theory of such a process,
potentially due to problems posed by traditional disciplinary boundaries. Here we
propose such a theory, formalized as an agent-based model, integrating insights from
complex systems theory, contest theory, behavioral economics and cultural evolution
theory. The model reproduces empirically observed patterns and makes predictions at
multiple levels. It further suggests that any system is likely to converge towards an
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equilibrium level of corruption determined by i) the information captured in the proxy
and ii) the strength of an intrinsic incentive towards the societal goal. Overall, the
theory offers mechanistic insight to subjects as diverse as the scientific reproducibility
crisis and the lack of an appropriate response to global warming.
1 Competitive societal systems
In complex societal systems, any competition to promote an abstract goal must by
necessity rely on proxy measures to rank agents with respect to their performance. This
suggests the applicability of Campbell’s or Goodhart’s Law to any proxy-based
competition [1–3]: Any proxy measure in a competitive societal system becomes a target
for the competing individuals (or groups), promoting corruption of the measure. In other
words, societal competition should be generally expected to create an informational
difference between proxy measures and the societal goals they were designed to promote.
Importantly, this should happen both by active behaviors (gaming) but also by a range
of purely statistical mechanisms [4, 5].
The societal system performs the dual task of collecting the information to create
the proxy measure(s) and creating the institutions that implement competition. While
modern societies increasingly rely on competitive systems and the proxy measures they
require, there are prominent arguments and compelling evidence suggesting corruption
of the measures (Table 1 [5–16]). Indeed, it is conceivable that a highly proxy-oriented
system leads to substantial effort- and resource misallocation with detrimental effects on
the actual societal goal. Importantly, this would remain hidden as long as the proxy
persisted as the central evaluative tool of system performance. We suggest the term
proxy-economy for a highly proxy-oriented, or in Campbell’s terms “corrupted”, system.
In such a system a large portion of activities and resources would be devoted toward the
proxy measures without furthering the actual societal goal. For instance in academia, a
substantial fraction of non-reproducible research across scientific disciplines, as well as
subjective researcher assesments, suggest an excessive proxy orientation [11]. Similarly,
a strong case can be made that rich economies as a whole have become mostly
proxy-oriented [13,14, 17–19]. Consider for instance, that subjective as well as objective
measures of well-being are logarithmically related to income (GDP) [20,21]. In other
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words, the relevant returns (societal goal) to economic growth (proxy) are exponentially
diminishing. Indeed, among rich nations the beneficial effect of economic growth is
dwarfed by other sources of variability, and quite challenging to even detect
statistically [18,20]. At the same time, the material footprint of economic growth,
including environmental externalities such as CO2 emissions, are linearly related to
income (GDP), implying that we are likely substantially underestimating negative
welfare consequences of economic growth.
Beside such macro-level arguments, another rich source of supporting evidence
results from critical examination of individual practices under competing accounts of
proxy- or goal-orientation provides [5, 10,22,23]. For instance, it has recently been
observed, that scientific sample size choices can be readily explained by a competitive
economic (proxy-driven) account, but are difficult to reconcile with scientific
deliberations (goal-driven) [23]. Finally, it is important to point out that the mentioned
examples appear to display what might be called a lock-in effect, i.e. persistent
corruption despite widespread acknowledgement of the arising problems, combined with
accounts of limited agency. Understanding the nature and mechanism of such lock-in is
likely to prove crucial to addressing phenomena ranging from the scientific
reproducibility crisis to combating anthropogenic climate change.
Table 1. Illustratory examples of goals, proxies, and corruption claims in proxy-based competititive
systems.
Science Medicine Education Politics Markets
Societal
Goal
true and rele-
vant research
patient
health
knowledge,
skills
voter repre-
sentation
subjective
and objective
well-being
Proxy
Measure
publication
count, im-
pact factor
patient num-
bers, profit
standardized
test scores
publicity,
votes
income,
profit, GDP
Corruption
Claims
reproducibility
crisis
[5, 8, 9, 12,16]
bad pa-
tient care,
overtreat-
ment [15,24]
teaching to
the test [6, 7]
populism,
lobby-
cracy [25,26]
financial
crises,
global warm-
ing [10,13,14]
Any competitive societal system to achieve and abstract goal must rely on proxy measures. However, and proxy measure
becomes a target for the competing individuals (or groups). Campbell’s and Goodhart’s Laws state that this will promote
corruption of the measures. [1–3]
Despite the similarity in the arguments in these diverse competitive systems, the
extensive evidence, and the profound implications for societal welfare, we lack a
coherent theory of the underlying processes. We believe this has two main reasons, one
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empirical, one theoretical. A general empirical problem is posed by an inherent
complexity/ambiguity gradient between proxy and goal. Specifically, the aspects of the
societal goal which are most easily quantified are most likely to be captured in the
proxy, biasing corruption toward whatever is difficult to quantify. Accordingly, much of
the evidence suggesting a corruption of practices tends to be qualitative, voiced in
interviews, editorials and surveys [8, 11,12,27]. Additional goal aspects may be costly to
assess or only become apparent in the long term. Such aspects can be quantified as
alternative proxies and will remain unaffected by corruptive pressures as long as they
play a minor role in competition. For instance scientific reproducibility, long term costs
of excessive financial risk taking and environmental degradation play a minor role in
competition and thus provide a quantitative measure of corruption [10,28]. Additional
potential quantitative measures are specific readouts of corruption, such as retraction
counts [29] or small sample sizes [5]. The current revolution in data-science promises to
provide ample testing ground for the present theory [9]. However, due to the complexity
of societal systems any individual study providing evidence in any of these domains
remains difficult to interpret in isolation.
The second, theoretical, challenge to a cohesive theory of proxy-based competition is
its necessarily trans-disciplinary nature. We identify three fundamental questions such a
theory must address. These are traditionally treated in separate disciplines.
Importantly, all three questions arise directly from the core problem of proxy-based
competition in societal systems (Table 1):
1. What is the informational relation between proxy measures and the societal goal
in the space of all possible practices/actions? (complex systems and control
theory; information economics)
2. How do individual agents make decisions, given potentially conflicting information
and value dimensions? (multitasking theory; contest theory; behavioral/neuro-
economics; behavioral ethics)
3. How do inter-individual mechanisms such as selection/ cultural evolution affect
the system? (sociology; cultural evolution theory)
We separate these questions for narrative convenience and conceptual clarity, though
they are complexly interrelated. While the first and third questions address primarily
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the system level the second question concerns psychological decision mechanisms. In the
following, we describe a simple agent-based computational model, constructed to
integrate and formalize confluent insights across these disciplines and feedback loops
between levels. The overall goal is to determine the principal components necessary to
capture the processes described above and explore possible formal specifications. In the
process, we outline the tenets of a unified theory of what we will call Proxyeconomics,
which applies to any proxy-based competitive system maintained by society to serve an
abstract goal. Briefly, our model results suggest that any such system approaches a
relatively stable equilibrium level of corruption determined by the information captured
in the proxy and the strength of a putative intrinsic incentive ’to do your job well’.
Moreover, the dynamics of corruption, or corruptive pressure, is governed by the
intensity of competition and potentially the complexity of practices. Additionally, at the
meso-scale, we find a range of incompletely understood but consistently observed effort
choice patterns, described in the experimental contest literature [30]. For instance,
effort-incentivization appears to be hill shaped with respect to competition, i.e. effort is
highest for intermediate, rather than very mild or very intense, competition. In the
following, we will first sequentially introduce and motivate the model components. We
will then present detailed results on model behavior and robustness. Next, we will
discuss these results including the model’s limits, wider implications and possible
extension. Finally, we will briefly discuss a number of additional implications of the
theory of proxy-based competition including several psychological, economic, political
and moral aspects.
2 The model
We developed the model in order to capture the following general notions, each
representing convergent insights by the respective disciplines, in the most parsimonious
yet plausible way.
1. The proxy can be viewed as the ‘objective function’ of an optimization problem in
a complex adaptive system [4,31,32]. Therefore there will always be some
informational difference between proxy measures and societal goal (likely
proportional to the complexity of the societal system).
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2. Individuals are motivated not only by egoistic interests but also by an intrinsic
moral motivation. [10,33–36]. Furthermore, in competition, a powerful desire to
(professionally) survive suggests some form of (proxy-based) reference dependence,
well captured by a sigmoidal utility function [37–41].
3. Variability in culturally/professionally transmitted practices and selection through
competition introduces cultural evolution at the system level [5].
Importantly, there will be interactions including feedback loops within and between
individual and system level. The information affecting individual decisions will depend
on the information at the system level. The competition experienced by individuals
relates to the competitive selection at the system level. Finally, and most importantly,
proxy performances affect outcomes primarily as a relative measure, i.e. by their
relation to other agents’ proxy performances. This implies feedback loops for i)
psychologically driven proxy performance, ii) selection driven proxy performance and iii)
between the two processes. An agent-based modeling approach is ideally suited to
capture these notions including the feedback loops within and between levels.
The model draws from information/control theory and economic principal-agent
theory by viewing a societal system as an information processing device or principal,
respectively (see detailed model description and discussion [4, 42]). A neuroeconomically
plausible (utility and reference based) effort incentivization mechanism [43] is modeled
using concepts from prospect theory and multitasking theory [10,37,38,42].
Simultaneously, the processes described by Campbell’s Law are modeled as a form of
cultural evolution, on a slower but overlapping timescale [5, 44]. The combination of
these approaches allows us to investigate the tension between positive and negative
effects of competition. Specifically two positive effects, namely effort incentivization and
signaling/screening of talent, cooccur with negative effects, namely incentives to game
the system and selection of corrupt practices. The model furthermore provides a way to
probe the power of ‘intrinsic motivations’ to bound a long term evolution towards
corrupt practices, as recently suggested by Smaldino and McElreath [5].
Briefly, we model a societal system, in which utility maximizing agents repeatedly
compete with each other based on individual proxy-performances. Individual
performances result from both the individual’s effort and the orientation of their
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practice toward the proxy. The system is characterized by the following: The amount of
corruptible proxy information, parametrized as the goal angle (ga, competition (c),
parametrized as the fraction of losers; cultural evolution, parametrized through a
practice mutation amplitude (m) and selection pressure (sp). Intuitively, ga and m
reflect the complexity of the societal system while c and sp respectively reflect the
psychologically experienced and realized intensity of competition. Individual
utility-maximizing agents are characterized by talent (t) and a parameter determining
the relative power of an intrinsic moral incentive toward the societal goal over the
extrinsic competitive incentive (gs). Finally, the individual agent’s properties of effort
(e) and practice orientation (θ) represent the main outcomes of interest, informing on i)
the emergent corruption and ii) the systems overall efficacy. In the following we will
sequentially introduce our model specifications and parameters in the three building
blocks mentioned above, beginning with a short section on competition and model time
course.
3 Detailed model description
3.1 Competition and model time-course
Competition is a central variable, which is likely to impact individual decisions as well
as system-level selection. For a given population, we define competition simply as the
fraction of ‘losing’ agents c ∈ [0, 1], i.e. agents in danger of (professionally) dying due to
insufficient proxy-performance at a given time point. Professional death (briefly
refereed to as death) refers to the permanent elimination from the respective system.
For instance, in intense competition (c = 0.9) an agent has to be in the top 10% of
proxy-performers to be a ‘winner’. This then affects both the psychological decision
mechanism and system-level selection as described below.
The model proceeds in time steps, each of which is subdivided into a decision phase
and an evolution phase. In the decision phase all agents are drawn in random order to
adjust their efforts to maximize utility given their individual properties (θ, t. see below)
and the currently observed competitive rank (of proxy performance). In the evolution
phase, losing proxy performers are subject to stochastic death, and are instantaneously
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replaced by offspring from winning proxy-performers, such that the population size
stays constant. Together, this models a competitive system in which agents make their
decisions based on the observed proxy-performances of all other agents, but are unsure
about the exact time frame of competition, i.e. to which degree other agents might still
change their proxy performance before a selection event might occur. The continuous
repeated comparisons, occurring in consecutive time steps resemble what has been
called ‘multi-contest tournament’ [45].
3.2 The practice space - information content of the proxy
We conceptualize the informational relation between proxy and goal with respect to the
value-creation associated with specific cultural practices. A cultural practice is defined
as a specific pattern of actions, that can be associated with potentially differing relative
contributions to the societal goal and the proxy (similar to e.g. [5, 10, 26] in the fields of
science, politics and economics, respectively). In the main model the cultural practice is
predominantly learned and transmitted within a given cultural entity (laboratory,
company, ...), but we later also explore outcomes if practices are subject to individual
agency. Four fundamental groups of practices can be intuitively differentiated based on
the degree to which they are beneficial or detrimental to the proxy and goal value
(Fig 1A). For instance, in any specific societal context, we may consider if practices exist
that exclusively contribute to either the proxy measure or the societal goal. The
existence of such practices motivates the dimensional reduction of the practice space to
two dimensions representing the proxy and the goal (as in economic
multitasking [10,42]). The degree to which the proxy captures true and incorruptible
information (i) about the societal goal can then be represented as the angle between the
main axes (goal angle; ga ∈ [0◦, 180◦]), where information i ∈ [−1, 1] is given by Eq. 1.
i = cos(ga) (1)
Intuitively, information measures the effect on the societal goal when practices are
exclusively oriented towards the proxy. A good proxy (0 < i < 1) captures sufficient
information about the societal goal, such that even fully corrupted practices produce
positive outcomes for the actual societal goal (Fig 1B). In contrast, when full proxy
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Fig 1. The practice space, Individual practices may contribute to different degrees
to the proxy measure and the societal goal, motivating the mapping of all practices to a
two-dimensional practice space. Sections of the practice space which are beneficial/
detrimental to the proxy/goal are color coded (see colored labels in A). The degree to
which the proxy captures true and incorruptible information about the societal goal can
then be represented as the angle between the main axes, denoted goal angle (ga) with
information (i = cos(ga)). Exclusively proxy oriented practices are located on the
horizontal axis (proxy measure). Accordingly, when such (corrupted) practices are
neither beneficial nor detrimental to the societal goal, then ga = 90◦ and i = 0 (A).
Presumably, in most cases the proxy captures sufficient incorruptible information about
the goal such that even even fully proxy oriented practices contribute to the societal
goal (0◦ < ga < 90◦; 1 > i > 0 (B). However, full proxy orientation may also lead to
negative outcomes for the actual societal goal (90◦ < ga < 180◦; 0 > i > −1 (C). When
ga 6= 90◦ the goal component orthogonal to the proxy is labeled ‘goal (oc)’.
orientation produces negative externalities which outweigh the beneficial effects for the
societal goal, this is captured by −1 < i < 0 and 90◦ < ga < 180◦ (Fig 1C).
Externalities beyond the dimensions described above, i.e. that are independent of both
proxy and goal (e.g. leisure time), are not considered in the current model. We reason
that i and ga relate directly to the complexity of the system with i tending toward 0 and
ga toward 90◦ as complexity and, with it, the number of failure modes increases [46].
3.2.1 The proxy
We can most easily think of the proxy as a simple scalar metric, such as the journal
impact factor or quarterly profits. More generally, the proxy should be thought of as an
arbitrarily complex regulatory model [47], embodied in the societal mechanisms
designed to collect information and transform it into competitive rankings. Arbitrarily
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complex, here, explicitly includes mechanisms relying on expert judgement [3], as long
as the outcome is a competitive ranking. In analogy to the economic revealed preference
approach, we can think of the proxy as the set of attributes that factually determine
selection within the competitive system (the revealed preference of the
system/mechanism). In analogy to the machine learning and artificial intelligence
literature, it is helpful to think of the proxy as an objective function [4]. In all these
analogies, the societal system is conceptualized as an information processing device,
collecting complex input information and converting it to an actionable output metric
(competitive rankings). The boundary case of a perfect regulatory model maps to a goal
angle of ga = 0◦.
3.2.2 The goal
The societal goal is the arbitrary consensus set of properties society wants to
achieve/regulate (see examples in Table 1). Though this is difficult to precisely define in
any specific context, it is important to bear in mind that such a consensus set is implied
by the fact that society maintains an artificial competitive system in the first place.
Practical and information-theoretic considerations further help to predict the ways a
goal is likely to differ from the proxy [4, 31,47]. This can allow a relational or negative
definition (e.g. a preponderance of irreproducible publications may not further the
societal goal). Note that, in the present model, we define the societal goal as only those
goal-aspects, which are privately known to individual agents. This definition of the
societal goal may be most productive, since aspects of the goal unknown at the
individual and the institutional level may be particularly difficult to address. In the
present model, individuals are assumed to have superior knowledge as to the precise
profiles of their actions and their implications. Indeed, there are numerous reports of
individuals in competitive systems who state that competition is impeding their ability
to act according to the societal goal. This directly implies private knowledge of
implications for the goal which are not captured by the proxy (for instance see [10,48]
for examples from science and banking, respectively). Similarly, a substantial portion of
the general population personally feels that their whole job (which is the result of
competitive market mechanisms) does not contribute to societal welfare in any way [49].
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3.3 Individual choice - multitasking
The system-level definition of the practice space now allows us to intuitively capture the
notion of proxy-orientation of a given agent’s practices by their ‘practice angle’ (θ;
Fig 2A-C). The agents effort level is assumed to be the length of a vector along this
practice angle and the true contributions to proxy and goal value are the projections
onto the main axes. This captures a positive effort to output relation, where only the
type of output depends on practice orientation. To allow both, an intrinsic (goal) and a
competitive (proxy) incentive to elicit effort, we adapt an economic principal-agent
multitasking model (Fig 2A). Note that in contrast to traditional multitasking models,
we here allow practice angles to be established either through individual choice, or
through a process of cultural evolution (i.e at the system level). The practice angle of
an agent reflects the average outcome of all the different actions and choices she makes
in an individual time step, i.e. it may include strategies such as cheating or sabotaging
a fraction of the time, which would translate to a lower average θ.
Accordingly, the effort of the ith agent ei ∈ R≥0 is modeled as the length of the
vector with orientation θi and the resulting proxy and goal values are the projections
onto the main axes capturing the practice dependent trade-off (Eq 2,3).
V gi (θi, ei) = cos(ga− θi) · ei (2)
V pi (θi, ei) = cos(θi) · ei (3)
The utility derived from the goal performance is simply the goal value multiplied by
a constant (gs), determining the relative psychological strength of an intrinsic, moral
incentive toward the societal goal (Eq 4). Given that goal in our settings refers to
aspects known to agents, gs can be seen as a product of i) goal valuation and ii)
individually available goal information.
Ugi (V
g
i ) = gs · V gi (4)
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Fig 2. Agent decision model, Agents derive utility both from contributing to the
societal goal and performing well according to the proxy measure (blue, red
respectively). An individual agent (index i) produces goal value (V gi ) and proxy value
(V pi ) as determined by the practice angle (θi) and effort (ei), simply as the projection of
the effort vector onto the main axes (eqs. 2 and 3; A-C), where the goal angle (ga) is
the angle between the main axes (see Fig 2). The utility derived in the proxy dimension
(denoted prospect) depends not on the absolute proxy value but on the relative ranking
of proxy values and the survival threshold according to eqs. 5 and 6. Panels D, E show
illustrative prospect functions (dark red) for competition c = 0.5 and c = 0.9
respectively. The survival threshold (vertical spotted line in D, E) is the salient
reference proxy value separating losers from winners, where competition (c) denotes the
fraction of losers. Accordingly, for c = 0.5 or c = 0.9, the survival threshold is the 50th
or the the 90th percentile of the population distribution of proxy values respectively
(grey histograms in D, E respectively).
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3.4 Individual choice - competition as incentive
The utility derived from the proxy value, denoted ‘prospect’ (Upi ), is determined
through competition (Fig 2D, E). It depends on the relation of the own proxy value V pi
and the proxy value required for professional survival (the survival threshold, ST ). The
survival threshold is the proxy value which separates winners and losers for a given level
of competition. For instance c = 0.9 indicates that the survival threshold is the proxy
value at the 90th percentile of the distribution of all proxy values, i.e. an agent has to
be in the top 10% proxy performers to be a winner. The survival threshold is assumed
to be the salient reference point with respect to which agents evaluate the utility of
their own proxy value. Accordingly, they will derive negative/positive utility if they are
below/above the survival threshold. In the first version of this manuscript/model we
have considered a prospect function based on a Gaussian uncertainty distribution
around the survival threshold (based on [38,40,50]). Though the main results were
similar (see manuscript history on arXiv), this function was not scale invariant with
respect to proxy value. Therefore we here choose a similarly sigmoid, but scale invariant
prospect function, namely that of cumulative prospect theory (Eq 5 [51]).
Upi (V
p
i , ST, ) = (V
p
i − ST )0.88 (5)
Additionally, we assume agents are loss averse, i.e negative prospects are multiplied
by 2.25 (Eq 6, [51]).
Upi 7→

Upi , if U
p
i ≥ 0
Upi · 2.25, otherwise
(6)
In a subset of models, we additionally probed a simple step function as prospect
function [-1,1]. Each agent Ai, when she is drawn, chooses her effort level to maximize
her individual utility Ui given the observed current proxy performances of all other
agents (Eq 7),
Ui(U
g
i , U
p
i , cost) = U
g
i + U
p
i − cost(ei, ti) (7)
where effort cost is given by:
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cost(ei, ti) = e
2
i /ti (8)
Here ti is the talent of the agent, i.e. a constant determining the relative cost of
effort independent of θ. Agents are given variable talent according to N (10, tsd) such
that the effort to proxy-performance relation depends on both individual practice
orientation and talent. This allows us to capture beneficial effects of the proxy as
signaling/screening device for talent, as well as detrimental effects (Campbell’s Law).
Note, that the the latter could similarly be described as signaling/screening of corrupt
practices, and our model allows beneficial and detrimental mechanisms to act
simultaneously. In order for individual agents to compute the complex maximization
problem described above, we assume they consider a limited range of effort adjustments,
namely [-10, -5, -1, -0.5, -0.1, 0, 0.1, 0.5, 1, 5, 10]. The rationale behind this is that the
agent intuitively judges what might happen if she changes her effort just a little or a lot
but lacks the computational capacity for perfect maximization. Nevertheless, if the
system is stable enough, she will iteratively approach the optimal effort. Note, that
alternative effort choice lists (e.g. -10 to 10 in 0.1 increments) did not change model
outcomes but dramatically increased the computational burden of agents (and model).
Furthermore, the specific range (-10 to 10) simply covers the magnitude of plausible
effort changes in the system arising from the arbitrary mean talent choice of 10, and
choosing a larger range did not change outcomes. In a subset of models, practice agency
was introduced by letting agents maximize utility over the effort test-list for each of a
range of practice-adjustments in an angle-list of [-5°, -1°, 0°, 1°, 5°], following the same
rationale.
3.5 Selection and evolution
When all agents have been randomly drawn to adjust their efforts (and potentially
practice), the ranking of proxy-performances is reassessed. Each potential loser
(V pi < ST ) is then subject to professional death with probability = selection pressure
(sp ∈ [0, 1]). Accordingly, sp determines the approximate number of steps one can afford
to be a loser before being actually removed, relating experienced to realized competition.
Upon each death a position opens up, which allows a randomly chosen ‘winning’
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proxy-performer (V pi > ST ) to professionally reproduce, passing her practice angle on
to her offspring.
During practice inheritance, θ mutates stochastically, such that
θoffspring = θparent +N (0,m). We reason that the magnitude of the mutation rate m is
proportional to the complexity of the societal system. Large mutation rates reflect
potentially large and frequent effects of minor practice changes on proxy and goal values
driven by i) an increasing number of nonlinear interactions in more complex systems
and ii) the combinatorial explosion of possible action to outcome mappings with
increasing complexity [46]. In this context it is important to remember that the practice
space represents a dimensional reduction to the orthogonal components of proxy and
goal. Accordingly, mutations can be thought of as comprising arbitrary changes in
additional independent dimensions, for instance animal welfare in meat production
(assuming animal welfare is not considered a societal goal of the industry).
3.6 Implementation/ model development/ parameter choice
The model was implemented in the agent-based modeling framework ‘Mesa0.8’ in
Python3.6 and run on a standard Windows7, 64bit operating system. The full code to
run the model and generate figures is attached as supplemental material.
Table 2 shows an overview of the explored parameter space with the parameters
shown here highlighted in boldface (also see Fig 5). A number of additional parameters
were varied to probe robustness, but lead to no change, and will be reported at
appropriate locations throughout the manuscript. The model was initialized with
population size N (typically 100), where every agent received a practice angle θ drawn
randomly from a uniform distribution between proxy and goal axes U(0, ga) and initial
effort 0. Model runs were typically repeated 10 times for each level of competition to
obtain measures of the mean and spread of system behavior. In each model run, all
agents in a population compete against each other via their proxy performances as
described above.
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Table 2. Parameter space
Parameter Base
Value(s),
Range
Description Main effect (if parameter is increased)
equilibrium determining parameters
goal angle
(ga)
45, 90, 135,
0 -180
angle (◦) defining the amount of
corruptible proxy information
hill shaped effect on equilibrium corrup-
tion, the optimal level of competition
decreases
goal scale
(gs)
1, 2, 0-10 scaling factor of psychological
goal valuation (relative to experi-
enced prospect value)
increased effort, decreased equilibrium
corruption
dynamics determining parameters
competition
(c)
0.3, 0.6, 0.9,
0.1-0.9
competitive pressure, i.e. the
fraction of potential losers per
round
complex effects on effort, evolution and
utility (see main text), increased speed
of convergence to equilibria
selection
pressure
(sp)
0.001, 0.1,
0.001-1
probability of death for each los-
ing agent in each round
increased speed of convergence to equi-
libria
parameters affecting variability
talent stan-
dard devia-
tion (tsd)
1, 0-6 standard deviation of talent
within the population
increased effort spread
population
size (N)
100, 10-500 number of agents in the system decreased variability over models
practice
mutation
rate (m)
2, 0-30 standard deviation (◦) of prac-
tice angle mutations during in-
heritance
increased practice variability and, if the
equilibrium practice is outside the ini-
tialization range, speed of convergence
to equilibria
Overview of the parameter space. During sensitivity analysis individual parameters were varied in the specified ranges holding
all other parameters at the base values. Presented base values are in boldface (Fig 5, 6). The remaining base values were
additionally probed.
4 Results
We will first introduce the model using an exemplary parameter set and short timescale,
emphasizing the emergent patterns of effort and practices, in order to demonstrate the
surprising scope of overlap with empirical observation from the experimental contest
literature. We will then demonstrate the main result of competition-induced equilibrium
corruption at a longer timescale. Finally we will present the results of a detailed
sensitivity analyses demonstrating the robustness of equilibrium corruption and
revealing the parameters governing it.
To introduce the model we consider a system in which the proxy contains some
incorruptible and some corruptible information about the societal goal
(ga = 45◦; i = 0.5). Goal scale (gs) is set to one implying comparable weighting of proxy
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and goal incentive. Selection and mutation are mild (sp = 0.1,m = 2◦), implying a 10%
probability of death for losers at each time step and small changes of practice
orientation during inheritance. At initialization each agent receives a random practice
angle between full corruption and full goal orientation θ = U(0, ga) and normally
distributed talent t = N (10, 1).
4.1 Iterative effort choice - competitive incentivization and
discouragement
We begin by describing the emergent behavior resulting from iterative effort choice. In
brief, at each time step, agents in random order adjust their effort given the noisy
observations of proxy performances of competing agents and their personal parameters
(prospect function, practice angle and talent). This simple contest specification
produced a range of behaviors observed in experimental economics including i) optimal
effort incentivization at intermediate levels of competition, ii) a discouragement effect
and iii) effort bifurcation [30]. Importantly, we did not consider or anticipate any of
these effects during model design, but rather strove to create the simplest effort choice
algorithm applicable in a step wise agent-based model with plausible preferences,
information acquisition and computation of individual agents. The algorithm produced
a range of interesting individual effort trajectories, highly dependent on competition
(Fig 3A, four exemplary model runs ranging from very low to very intense competition).
Note that individual agent properties (practice orientation θ and talent t) are identically
distributed between competition levels. However, in higher competition, individual
agents are forced to increase effort to cross a higher survival threshold (the competitive
cutoff between winners and losers). This in turn affects the population distribution of
proxy values leading to a positive feedback loop and higher effort levels in higher
competition. When marginal effort cost begins to outweigh the expected utility gain,
individual agents may stop increasing or begin to decrease effort. Indeed, due to the
flattening of the prospect function when the observed survival threshold (given other
agents performances) is far beyond the own proxy performance, agents may become
‘discouraged’, i.e. decrease effort (Fig 3A, e.g. black arrows). In such cases the prospect
of winning becomes unrealistic with acceptable effort expenditure, such that agents opt
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to save effort cost. Discouragement becomes more frequent in more competitive systems,
leading to an eventual reversal of the competition to effort relation for some agents, as
observed empirically [52–54]. Increasing prevalence of discouragement with higher
competition also entails an increase in variance of effort at the population level. At the
individual level, agents similarly show more variable effort over time in higher
competition. This competition to effort-variance relation is highly robust, notably even
without agent heterogeneity (not shown), a testable prediction contrasting our model
with previous contest models [30]. Notice, how some agents progressively increase effort
in order to compete, but eventually become discouraged (Fig 3A, black arrows). The
resulting decrease in the survival threshold may in turn provide other agents with a
prospect of winning, such that they can gain utility by increasing effort (Fig. 3A, grey
arrow). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first neuroeconomically plausible
iterative effort choice algorithm which provides a mechanistic account of how
equilibrium effort is approached in contest settings (see also [55]). Notably, it
reproduces a remarkable range of empirically observed but incompletely understood
phenomena concerning both static effort distributions and effort trajectories and is
amenable to experimental verification.
Additional to these psychologically driven effects, competition determines selection
by defining the proportion of losers. Agents with insufficient proxy-performance (losers)
are subject to stochastic professional death with probability = sp, where death means
permanent elimination from the competitive system (indicated by white rectangles;
Fig 3A, e.g. white arrow). Upon a death, the free slot is immediately filled up by the
offspring of a random winning agent. Given, that competition determines the proportion
of losers and losers have uniform probability of death, selection events increase
proportionally with competition. Note that this specification keeps the population size
constant, modeling a societal system with fixed size and resource consumption where
increased competition is realized through an increased throughput of new agents.
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Fig 3. Short term dynamics (100 time steps), with
N = 100, ga = 45◦, θinitialization = U(0◦, ga), gs = 1, t = N (10, 1), sp = 0.1,m = 2◦.
Data are collected from 10 model runs per competition level (c). A-D show four levels of
competition (major columns) while D shows c = [0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9]. A and B show
individual agents while C-E show population means from repeated model runs as data
points. A) Agent Dynamics, Each subpanel shows effort over time for each of the
100 agents (random run for given c). Columns within subpanels represent individual
agents or positions. White squares indicate death/birth events (two example highlighted
with white arrows). Black arrows indicate examples of agents becoming discouraged by
competition. Grey arrows indicate examples of agents increasing effort to gain the
prospect of winning. B) Agent Values, Realized proxy and goal values of each agent
at the 50th time step. Values are the result of the current chosen effort given the
individual agents practice angle (compare Fig 3B). Each data point represents an agent
(agents accumulated from 10 runs per panel). Talent is color coded. The black and grey
arrows indicate highly proxy or goal oriented agents, respectively. Note that the agents
indicated by the grey arrow are outperforming those indicated by the black arrow
concerning their goal performance, but not proxy performance. C, D) Model
Dynamics, Model level dynamics of proxy and goal value (C) and the mean practice
angle (D). E) Model Values, Final (step 100) mean proxy and goal values (left) and
utility and practice angle (middle) as a function of competition. Data on mean proxy
and goal values can be projected back into the practice space (right) as in Fig 2A. The
shaded area around lines represents the standard deviation over model runs.
4.2 Realized value in the practice space - simultaneous
beneficial and detrimental signaling
The relative ability of individual agents to compete depends on two parameters, namely
talent and practice orientation, both of which are not directly observable. Talent allows
greater effort, independent of practice orientation. Accordingly, if practices are fixed, the
proxy fulfills its intended role as signal of goal performance, allowing efficient screening
by the competition. At the same time, however, high proxy performance may result
from higher proxy orientation of the practice, implying wasteful or even detrimental
signaling (Campbell’s Law). In our model, both processes act simultaneously and can
be assessed by visualizing realized practice-effort pairs of individual agents back into the
practice space with color-coded talent (Fig 3B). Here each data point represents the
endpoint of the effort vector (as in Fig 3A-D) of an individual agent at time step 100.
The resulting goal and proxy performances correspond to the projections onto the main
axes, as shown in Fig 3B). Across all levels of competition, we observe a dominant effect
of the competitive incentive on realized effort levels, as outcomes tend to organize in
vertical lines, i.e. they cluster around a specific proxy value. Further analysis showed
that the vertical line corresponded to proxy-values just above the emergent survival
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threshold for a given level of competition. Agents just below this threshold had either
increased effort attempting to enter the win-domain or decreased effort further, to save
effort cost. Accordingly, the sigmoidal prospect function, including loss aversion, drives
effort bifurcation, particularly when judging effort by proxy performance.
Also across all levels of competition, but most prominently for high competition, we
observe a beneficial signaling/screening effect of the proxy as higher talent translates to
higher proxy performance. We furthermore Another interesting emergent phenomenon
is a competition dependent reversal of relative effort expenditure by agents with high
practice angles. In low competition (Fig 3B, c = 0.1, leftmost panel) agents with high
practice angles are forced to put in extra effort, but are still able to compete, leading to
particularly high relative contributions to the societal goal. By contrast, when
competition is intense (Fig 3B, c = 0.9, rightmost panel) agents with more goal oriented
practices can no longer compete on the proxy scale and are preferentially discouraged,
even if they have high talent. Notice, that the emergent practice-effort realizations cover
several qualitatively distinct domains across the practice space, where observable proxy
performance only partially predicts unobservable goal performance. Some agents are
peak proxy performers, while only moderately contributing to the actual societal goal
(Fig 3B, black arrow). Simultaneously, some highly talented agents are ‘losing’ in
proxy-competition, while actually outperforming many ‘winners’ regarding the actual
societal goal (Fig 3B, grey arrow). More generally, the model predicts that for any
observed proxy performance and at any time point, there is a mix of agents with highly
varying degrees of proxy orientation. Thus our model intuitively captures the
simultaneous effects of beneficial and detrimental signaling, which we believe to
invariably arise in any proxy-based competition.
4.3 Short term system dynamics
Preferential discouragement of goal oriented agents might translate to a divergence
between proxy and goal performance at the system level. To visualize variability at the
system level, the following data are displayed as mean and standard deviation over
model runs where each run is represented by the population mean of its agents. Indeed,
mean proxy and goal performance of populations of agents show distinct competition
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dependent dynamics (Fig 3C). Note an initial phase (within the first 10 steps), visible
as a steep rise in value as effort first adjusts to an initialization independent level
(models initialized with effort levels of 0, 1, 10 or 20 all converged to the same values
during this initial phase). Subsequently, value may progressively increase (Fig 3C,
c = 0.1 to 0.6) or decrease (Fig 3C, c = 0.9) due to feedback loops between individual
effort and survival threshold. More intense competition also leads to an increasing
divergence between proxy and goal value (Fig 3C). One driver of this effect is the
preferential discouragement of agents with high goal orientation, implying an overall
effort redistribution toward the proxy (a psychological mechanism of Campbell’s Law).
A second potential driver is a selective removal of goal oriented agents due to inferior
proxy performance (a cultural evolution mechanism of Campbell’s Law). The degree to
which this happens can be assessed by viewing the dynamics of the population mean
practice angle, which is independent of effort (Fig 3D). With a goal angle of 45◦, the
initial uniform distribution of practices between proxy and goal leads to an initial
population mean practice of θ = ga/2 = 22.5◦. However, as selection removes agents
with high practice angles, replacing them with offspring from agents with lower angles,
the population mean evolves toward the proxy. As expected, the speed of evolution
towards the proxy is proportional to the intensity of competition since the quantity of
selection events drives population change of practices. Thus, our model reproduces a
central finding by Smaldino and McElreath [5], namely the the powerful corruptive force
of proxy guided cultural evolution.
4.4 System outcomes over competition
To obtain a more complete view of proxy and goal performances we next plot the mean
final values of this short period (step 100) as a function of competition (Fig. 3E, left;
data points represent model runs). Note that for both proxy and goal value, there is an
optimal level of competition. No increases in goal performance are achieved by
competition greater than c ≈ 0.4 while proxy-performance suggests c ≈ 0.6 is
optimal.Very low competition implies low effort incentivization, leading to low value
creation in both proxy and goal domains. As competition increases there is increasing
effort incentivization but simultaneously proxy and goal values begin to diverge, due to
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the dual process of selective discouragement and evolution described above.
Furthermore, at very high competition, an increasing fraction of discouraged agents,
leads to decreasing mean effort. Another negative effect of competition is lower mean
utility of the participating agents (Fig 3E, middle panel). Though each agent
individually maximizes utility, the necessity of being relatively better than other agents
pushes the system to relatively high effort levels (and effort cost), as agents
continuously attempt to break out of the loss frame [56]. Since the proportion of agents
in the loss frame however ultimately remains fixed by competition this leads to
decreasing utility. Notice, that we have not modeled positive utility from a flat wage
component, since it does not affect the utility maxima of individual agents and thus
system behavior. Adding a flat-wage utility (10 or 20 utils), increased utility by a
constant independent of competition, linearly shifting the utility distribution upward
(not shown), but not otherwise affecting model outcomes. Also notice however, that we
feel it is not necessary to assume a participation constraint, as our agents model trained
professionals and may accept substantial disutility rather than switching to a different
profession, which may involve additional costly training. Instead, agents may become
discouraged and cease participating due to a selection event (an endogenous
participation constraint). Accordingly, low mean utility may be interpreted as either
necessitating a higher flat-wage compensation or entailing a distressed agent population.
Finally, we directly visualize the population mean practice-effort combinations within
the practice space (Fig 3E, right panel). Competition is color coded, such that the effect
on both mean effort (vector length) and practice orientation (vector angle) are directly
visualized (compare Fig 2B and 3B). Thus, the model at the system level similarly
captures the trade-off between positive and negative effects of competition, and
reproduces the notion of an optimal level of competition resulting from both effort and
practice dynamics [4, 10].
4.5 Long term dynamics
So far, we have explored the model dynamics in the short term (100 time steps). We
reason this timescale is most relevant when assessing the dynamic effects of parameters,
such as the competitive pressure. Notably, additional mechanisms, such as delayed
October 3, 2019 23/51
identification and removal of corrupted practices, or a generally continuously changing
system might render these short term pressures dominant in determining system
behavior. However, our model also provides the opportunity to examine the long term
system behavior resulting only from effort choice dynamics and cultural evolution
(Fig 4, 10000 time steps). In a previous similar study, practices were found to inevitable
evolve to full corruption [5]. Our model allows to test if a moral incentive component
has the power to bound this detrimental evolution. As observed above, the range of
existing practices in our model evolves toward the proxy for all levels of competition
(Fig 4A, D). However, even in the most intense competition, an equilibrium is reached,
beyond which the average practice no longer becomes more corrupted (Fig 4D). Notably,
this equilibrium level of corruption was similar for all levels of competition (Fig 4E,
middle panel), differing only in the speed with which it was reached (Fig 4D). Given the
equilibrium corruption level, effort dynamics nevertheless produced an optimal level of
competition (c ≈ 0.2). Thus our model demonstrates that an intrinsic motivation to
work towards the societal goal can bound the evolution toward fully proxy oriented
practices. Note, that the emergent long term equilibrium is analogous to a lock-in state,
i.e. a stable system orientation toward the proxy, while individual agents i) know the
impact of their actions toward and ii) value the societal goal.
4.6 Sensitivity/robustness analysis
Next we tested the sensitivity of these results to parameter variations. Since a full
combinatorial exploration of the parameter space is unfeasible, we followed a three-stage
strategy: We first systematically varied one parameter at a time holding the other
parameters constant (Fig 5; base value in boldface), monitoring the effect on corruption
(θ). We found that parameters fell into three main groups: i) equilibrium determining
parameters (Fig 5A; ga, gs), ii) dynamics determining parameters (Fig 5C, D, c, sp,m)
and iii) parameters affecting predominantly system variability (Fig 5B; tsd, N) . We
then attempted to find deviations from this initial classification by repeating one at a
time analysis with a selected range of alternative anchor values, (Table 2, base values in
italics). In over 100 targeted additional model runs, we failed to find such deviations,
suggesting our mapping of the main parameter effects was robust. Finally, we
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Fig 4. Long term dynamics, (10000 time steps), with
N = 100, ga = 45◦, θinitialization = U(0◦, ga), gs = 1, t = N (10, 1), sp = 0.1,m = 2◦.
For panel descriptions please refer to Fig 3. In (A) only a subset of agents and every
10th time step is depicted.
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undertook two major modification, namely we introduced a step-prospect-function or
practice agency, and again found the general relations to hold (with the exception of the
system dynamics under practice agency, see below, Fig 6).
Across all model specifications equilibrium corruption was determined predominantly
by the informational quality of the proxy (ga) and the psychological power of the
intrinsic incentive towards the societal goal (gs; Fig 5A). In the main model, the
dynamics of corruption was predominantly determined by the level of competition (c)
and the degree to which competition was realized in actual selection events (sp; Fig 5C,
D). Practice mutation rate (m) had no notable effect on equilibrium or dynamics of
corruption for these standard models (Fig 5D, F, top), but did contribute to the
dynamics of corruption when the equilibrium practice was outside the initialization
range (Fig 5D, F, bottom). By contrast, the number of agents in competition (N) and
talent spread (tsd) affected mainly system variability (Fig 5B). Thus, our model
suggests, that equilibrium corruption is determined primarily by proxy information (ga)
and the intrinsic moral drive toward the societal goal (gs). Additionally, the drive
toward this equilibrium corruption is governed by the intensity of competition (c, sp)
and potentially the complexity of the system (m).
Finally, we tested the robustness of these main findings for two major model
modifications, a step-prospect-function and practice agency. First we replaced the
prospect function by a simple step function (prospect = -1 for losers, 1 for winners;
Fig 6A-C). While overall effort and value creation was lower (given the lower maximal
prospect differential), the respective effects of the parameters remained robust. This is
important, given that the Kahnemann/Tversky type prospect considered primarily may
apply to individual agents, but may not hold when larger entities, such as labs or
companies, are considered as agents. Second, we introduced agency over the practice
angle by letting agents choose not only effort but also practice to maximize utility at
every time step. Remarkably, the main determinants of equilibrium corruption, i.e. ga
and gs, again followed the same pattern (Fig 6, D-E). However, introducing practice
agency led to a dramatically increased speed of convergence and decreased variability of
practices within a population. Indeed, our specification of practice agency was to
potent, that it effectively overrode the cultural evolution mechanism and related
parameters. Interestingly, it also markedly increased the ability of gs to counteract
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Fig 5. Sensitivity Analysis, parameter base values:
N = 100, ga = 45◦, θinit. = U(0◦, ga), gs = 1, t = N (10, 1), sp = 0.1,m = 2◦. One
parameter at a time was varied while leaving the other parameters at their base values.
Overview plots (panels A-C, E) show mean model outcomes at equilibrium /theta (step
numbers were increased until convergence to equilibrium was confirmed for each
parameter). Data points represent mean population outcomes of individual runs and
lines represent mean± sd. over runs A) Parameters controlling equilibrium corruption
(θ, grey): goal angle (ga), top; goal scale (gs), bottom. B) Parameters controlling
system variability: number of Agents (N), top; talent standard deviation (tsd), bottom.
C, D) Parameters controlling the speed of convergence: competition (c), top; selection
pressure (sp), bottom. (sp = 1 produced the same equilibrium, but is not shown
because the dynamics could no longer be resolved.) E, F) Parameter controlling system
dynamics if equilibrium θ is outside the initialization range. For our standard practice
initialization range (θinit = U(0
◦, 45◦)) m had no notable effect (top). If all practices
were initialized at θinit = 45
◦, m governed the dynamics of convergence, and in the case
of m = 0◦ precluded convergence (bottom).
corruption, leading to approximately twofold higher equilibrium θ (compare Figs 5A
and 6D). Thus our main finding, that equilibrium corruption is determined by ga and
gs was highly robust, while the dynamics determining effects of c, sp and m become less
relevant when agents continuously choose their practice orientation to maximize utility.
These results further suggest, that increased agency over practices may help counteract
corruption given sufficient gs.
5 Discussion
We have presented an agent-based computational model, sketching the central
components of a socio-economic theory denoted Proxyeconomics. The theory is
motivated by the central insight, that any societal competition to achieve an abstract
goal must rely on proxy measures. These invariably capture only partial information,
and become targets for the competing individuals, resulting in a susceptibility to
corruption. In the following, we will first discuss the agent-based model (section 5.1)
and then proceed to discuss additional implications of proxy-based competition, towards
a more general theory of proxyeconomics (section 5.2).
5.1 The agent-based model
In this section we will discuss the more general background of our model, including
specific limitations and potential extensions. We will begin by exploring the iterative
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Fig 6. Robustness, parameter base values:
N = 100, ga = 45◦, θinit. = U(0◦, ga), gs = 1, t = N (10, 1), sp = 0.1,m = 2◦. One
parameter at a time sensitivity analyses was repeated for two alternative models: One
containing a step-function prospect [-1,1] (A-C) and one containing agency over the
practice angle (D-F)
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effort choice algorithm (section 5.1.1), and the cultural evolution mechanism 5.1.2). We
will then discuss a range of broader informational, psychological and sociological
implications (sections 5.1.3 - 5.1.5), embedding the model in a larger, trans-disciplinary
literature.
5.1.1 Agent-based contest algorithm
The relation of our model to the economic contest literature deserves particular mention,
since to the best of our knowledge we are the first to implement a neuroeconomically
plausible iterative effort choice heuristic in an agent-based model of contests. Our
simple, neuroeconomically motivated, contest heuristic contains i) a neural
representation of utility, ii) multiple sources of input to this utility and iii) reference
dependence of this utility [43]. The sigmoidal prospect function represents a confluence
between ecological, psychological and economic theory [38]. It requires plausible, noisy
input information and computational capacity from individual agents. Intriguingly, the
emergent behavior reproduced many empirical findings, the origins of which are still
poorly understood [30]. Firstly, effort incentivization is usually optimal at intermediate
levels of competition, consistent with experimental and field observations [52–54].
Secondly, agents performing far below the survival threshold display a ‘discouragement
effect’ [30]. While traditionally discouragement is thought to result from agent
heterogeneity, our model predicts it even in cases without agent heterogeneity, simply
due to chance and the emergent distribution of proxy performances. For the same
reason, our model predicts a bifurcation of effort, particularly in the presence of
heterogeneity, but even without. Additionally, the model makes specific predictions
about how competition affects the variance of effort over time and the population. At
the same time, the model allowed to intuitively capture the signaling/screening effect on
talent but also proxy-orientation. This simultaneous screening for talent and
proxy-orientation, is suggested to arise in any proxy-based competition under most
conditions. Accordingly, observed high performers are likely to generally represent a mix
of true high performers (on the goal scale) and highly proxy-oriented agents. A
particularly interesting set of studies in this context are investigations of contests with
the possibility of sabotage [52,57]. A mixed strategy containing productive effort as well
as sabotage is analogous to a low practice angle in our model. Indeed, increased
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competition (a smaller fraction of winners or increased prize spread) led to a
redistribution of effort towards sabotage, consistent with our results. Notably, studies
addressing contest incentives in explicit multitask settings appear to be lacking and thus
remain a crucial avenue for future research [58]. Finally, our iterative effort choice
algorithm makes predictions about the temporal evolution of effort expenditure,
including its variability in time and the path of convergence to potential equilibria. In
this, it resembles previous experimental contest models based on reinforcement
learning [55] or belief-updating [45]. A specific prediction is variability of individual
effort over time and over the population, which is proportional to the level of
competition (qualitatively matching data presented in [52,59]). Accordingly, we
specified what is to our knowledge the first agent-based iterative effort choice algorithm.
This generative agent-based algorithm reproduced a remarkable range of empirically
observed effort patterns observed in the experimental contest literature, which were not
considered during model design [30,58]. Embedding this algorithm within a
multitasking framework further allowed us to intuitively model the complex screening
effect of competition on observed (proxy) as well as unobserved (goal) performance.
5.1.2 The evolution towards bad practices
A central question we posed of our model, was if such a multitasking mechanism could
alter a simultaneously acting mechanism of cultural evolution. Indeed, a previous
agent-based evolutionary model of cultural practices had reported a robust evolution
toward the worst possible practices [5]. The central unifying element with the present
model is the existence of a practice variable (θ in the present study), which alters the
relation between true (goal) and selected (proxy) performance, formalizing the
assumption that there exist practices which contribute differentially to proxy and goal.
Furthermore, this variable can be imperfectly inherited, formalizing the assumption that
professional practices are complex and transmitted from senior to junior professionals
imperfectly. In our view these assumptions are nearly self evident, and the resulting
detrimental evolution becomes a powerful prediction. However, even the authors note,
that this prediction seems overly pessimistic and invoke intrinsic incentives as a
counteracting power [5]. Here we have modeled such an intrinsic incentive, and observe
that it is able to bound the evolution to fully corrupted practices. Specifically, our
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model led to an equilibrium corruption level, which was substantial, but still markedly
different from full proxy orientation. This result is intuitively appealing and, in fact,
better matches the results of a meta-analysis of sample sizes within the same study [5].
The mean proxy-orientation as equilibrium was determined primarily by the
informational quality of the proxy (ga) and the relative psychological strength of an
intrinsic incentive toward the societal goal (gs). How both parameters may be
determined, or altered, will be further discussed below (sections 5.1.3 - 5.1.5). Notably,
our model suggests that increased agency over the practice orientation has the ability to
further decrease the level of corruption. Such agency may result from training in good
research practices, allowing a conscious deviation from questionable norms within a
research field. In the absence of practice agency, the dynamics of corruption in our
model were governed by competition (c and sp) and potentially complexity (m).
Adding practice agency let the model converge to equilibrium nearly instantaneously,
effectively occluding the dynamic effect of c, sp and m. However, in our implementation,
practice agency is substantial (with the similar speed and range as effort agency). In
real systems practices may be determined by a mix of social norms and individual
choice, suggesting outcomes may lie between our models with and without practice
agency. The interaction between the evolutionary process and an active practice choice
could be investigated in more detail by for instance probing models where practice
agency is allowed only stochastically. Indeed, exploratory analysis in such a model
suggests, that in such cases the level of competition can mediate between the equilibria
with and without practice agency. Accordingly, our model shows a reliable convergence
to a corruption equilibrium. This provides a mechanistic explanation for what we have
called lock-in. The model further suggests two general strategies to modify the
equilibrium, namely i) improving proxy information and ii) promoting goal valuation
(for instance through narratives [60], see below). Finally, it suggests competition and
agency as central variables determining the dynamics of the system.
5.1.3 Informational perspective - relation to artificial intelligence/
machine learning
The general approach of the current model was to view competitive societal systems as
information processing devices, which collect information to create the proxy and can
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ultimately be characterized by their realized competitive decisions. This approach
embeds the theory into a larger framework of optimization in complex systems discussed
in an extensive literature on complex systems, artificial intelligence and machine
learning [4, 31,46,47,61]. The proxy measure is analogous to an objective function and
the competitive pressure corresponds to optimization pressure. We suggest that all the
principal types of challenges that occur during machine learning optimization also apply
in competitive societal systems, including reward hacking, negative side effects and
scalable oversight [31]. For instance, the process of Campbell’s Law is closely related to
reward hacking. Negative side effects include reduced value in dimensions which do not
directly impact either proxy or goal. For instance, [12] suggest young scientists
progressively constrict their valuation repertoire to competitivity, at the cost of
‘sociability’. Scalable oversight describes the process of balancing the cost of creating
the proxy with the benefits from better proxy information. One main reason why proxy
measures will imperfectly reflect the societal goal is because they need to be cost
efficient. For instance, the information contained in an impact factor could be arguably
arbitrarily increased by adding more reviewers or having experiments reproduced.
Clearly, the cost of improving the proxy needs to be balanced with the potential
detrimental effects of an imperfect proxy. Note that both the cost of improving the
proxy and the potential detrimental effects of an imperfect proxy are likely to interact
with competition. More frequent competitive evaluations may be more costly to
perform while simultaneously incurring a higher unobserved cost due to corruption
pressures [16]. Introducing stochastic and/or delayed assessment and correction
mechanisms for corrupted practices may lead to new dynamic equilibira (but see [5]).
Importantly, considering which types of information are likely to be lost due to the
idiosyncrasies of specific competitive societal systems offers a prime path to predicting
corruption. For instance if proxies are assessed in predefined short time intervals, then
any outcome with longer time frames is subject to corruptive pressure. Other important
considerations include reliance on representatives and sampling in space and time. For
instance, market mechanisms collect information in a direct, decentralized and
continuous manner while other systems rely on representatives and predefined sampling
procedures (e.g. peer reviewers/ political representatives). Finally, if multiple
interlocked competitive systems interact it is important to consider if they share or
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reciprocally counteract informational deficits (see section 5.2.3).
Accordingly, the analogy to machine learning suggests three central conclusions: 1.
There is an optimal optimization-pressure which crucially depends on the information
captured in the proxy. 2. Problems are likely to arise through both continuous system
change and the optimization pressure itself, necessitating a continuous higher level
assessment process. 3. Analysis of the information generating mechanism of the proxy is
likely to provide detailed predictions on patterns of corruption. In other words, we
should continuously expect, attempt to measure, and mitigate corruption in any
competitive societal system. Importantly, the term corruption must be understood as
an inevitable system-level force arising through actions based on imperfect information,
which may, but need not, involve intention.
5.1.4 Decision theory
Our model draws on a large experimental literature addressing the individual level
decision mechanism, by including a moral component into decisions. While the adopted
economic multitask model provides an elegant way to formalize this, it must be stated
clearly, that the actual mechanisms are far from understood. For instance, it is unknown
what the relative motivational power of moral and competitive incentives is, particularly
for real professionals. Compared to laboratory settings both the moral incentive (e.g.
treating a patient well) and the competitive incentive (actual professional survival), may
be substantially more powerful. Nevertheless, experimental investigations [33,34,62]
consistently demonstrate that both moral and egoistic incentives play a role, and provide
essential insight about the potential psychological mechanisms during incentive conflicts.
Recently, Chugh and Kern [35] have even suggested that the need to maintain an ethical
self-image is the dominant principle, and that self-interested actions are only permitted
to the degree, that this self-image can be maintained. In light of this it is important to
note that implications of a decision for the societal goal are likely to be associated with
higher ambiguity, longer time frames and less personal relevance than implications for
the proxy [63]. This results directly from the concept of proxy-based competition, since
proxy is almost by definition an attempt to make an abstract societal goal concrete,
immediate and personally relevant. Of course this has unavoidable consequences for
decisions, given the well known phenomena of ambiguity discounting, temporal
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discounting and social discounting [64–66]. Another important question, addressed in a
separate literature, concerns the effect of competition on decisions [58]. While a large
body of experimental evidence demonstrates the power of competition as an incentive,
the underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood, particularly in multitask settings.
However, neuroeconomic research is beginning to reveal the important role of
loss-aversion in contests [39]. More generally, the fields of behavioral economics,
psychology and neuroeconomics are beginning to converge towards set of actual,
empirically validated, decision mechanisms. Specifically, they suggest a computationally
bounded mechanism with multiple (moral/ egoistic), potentially reference dependent,
valuation inputs converging into a single utility computation [43,67]. While we have
attempted to capture these confluent insights into our simple decision model, future
research, and more complex empirically validated decision models will unquestionably
yield a superior basis for generative agent-based models.
Finally, there is substantial empirical evidence for interindividual differences in
moral/egoistic drive. For instance, there is direct experimental evidence for an increased
propensity to sabotage in males than females [68], which may partially explain observed
productivity differences concerning the proxy [69]. Variable incentive strengths could be
easily modeled as variations in goal scale (or prospect function variability).
Incorporating such variability could inform on the outcomes of empirically observed
differences between genders or in ‘machiavellanism’ scales [70,71]. Accordingly, our
simple formalization of an agent-decision mechanism is i) neuroeconomically plausible
and ii) captures many important empirical findings. However, a large range of
additional complexities could be integrated into the model, in order to investigate their
implications. The most fruitful way to pursue this would, in our view, be through close
interaction between modeling and experimental approaches.
5.1.5 Sociological/ Cultural evolution perspective
The sociological/ cultural perspective explicitly acknowledges the complexity of cultural
practices and the degree to which these are determined beyond the individual level. We
have drawn from the model by [5], in order to capture the slow evolution of a large body
of cultural information implicit in professional practices. Additional, factors which may
prove highly relevant to long and short term outcomes, are the network structure
October 3, 2019 35/51
between agents and the precise formulation of information transmission between them.
In our model, all agents observe the noisy proxy performances of all other agents,
implying full network connectivity. Though this may seem unrealistic, the idea that
professionals are generally aware of their approximate competitive standing seems
justified. To verify robustness against the full connectivity assumption, we probed if
restricting the sampled proxy performances to 9 or 22 neighboring agents altered
outcomes, but this had no effects other than increasing variability (not shown). Future
models could further explore system dynamics if practice angles are influenced by social
forces such as the formation of social norms [72]. While, social-norm transmission is
implied in the hereditary transmission of practices modeled here, they may also be
determined more directly through neighboring agents (see e.g. [60]). This is likely to
introduce additional nonlinear effects in space and time, as locally normative practices
emerge or collapse. Notably, similar mechanisms could directly impact the knowledge
about, and valuation of, the societal goal (gs). For instance, Benabou et. al., [60] have
recently modeled the spread of moral narratives through populations. Such mechanisms
could be included to endogenize gs as a locally determined variable for each agent.
Another partially sociological factor, that has here been simplified into a single
exogenous variable is the goal angle, i.e the informational relation between proxy and
goal. In real systems, the proxy will be determined by the institutions creating it. From
the complex adaptive systems perspective, such institutions are best viewed as
autopoietic systems whose existence and stability is not necessarily related to any
societal goal [61, 73]. A variation of this view is that competitive institutions are
primarily self-reinforcing power-structures, and that the societal goal may serve only as
their public justification. We would argue that the public justification of the system
should be viewed as its societal goal. Moreover, the autopoiesis of institutions is likely a
necessary requirement for their existence and hence also for any contribution toward the
societal goal. Modeling societal institutions as autopoietic entities and probing how they
may be brought to additionally serve some abstract societal goal, could help to
understand how the goal angle may actually arise. Accordingly, our simple
formalization of cultural evolution captures some important sociological mechanisms,
but is dramatically simplified. Nevertheless, we believe that the progressive cultural
evolution toward the proxy, described here, should be a central component of any theory
October 3, 2019 36/51
of proxy-based societal competition.
In sum, our agent-based model captures a range of crucial implications of
proxy-based societal competition. It provides a first attempt to integrate two of the
central arising forces, and it’s central mechanisms are amenable to experimental
verification. Finally, it provides a versatile framework to explore additional complexities,
ranging from agent-level decision biases to network effects or implications of agent
heterogeneity.
5.2 Beyond the model
In this section we will discuss some broader implications of our theory. We will first
outline some striking policy and moral implications of the central premise. Next, we will
outline how proxy-based competitions may interlock and act over different scales, e.g. in
markets. A final brief section will suggest how we can systematically assess the
corruption of real systems, proposing that findings from behavioral economics can be
leveraged into predictions of corrupt patterns.
5.2.1 Policy implications
Interestingly, a number of familiar policy arguments can be directly derived from the
setup of proxy-based competition. For instance, one party may focus on the divergence
between proxy and societal goal, advocating costly improvement of proxies or regulation
of specific proxy-oriented practices. An opposing party may suggest that regulation or
improving proxies will not be cost effective, and that unilateral reorientation toward an
ambiguous societal goal will result in i) losing competition and ii) no change in proxy
orientation at the system level. The present theory implies that both arguments result
from a deep intuitive understanding of the system and that a confrontation of both
views is likely necessary for an optimal regulation of that system. Moreover, it suggests,
that the optimal degree and design of regulation will depend on the specifics of a
system, where importantly the degree of corruption, the potential cost/benefit of
improving the proxy, and the necessity for coordinated rather than unilateral action,
can be assessed systematically and scientifically (see e.g. section 5.1.3). One specific,
perhaps somewhat counter-intuitive policy prescription to mitigate corruptive pressures,
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while avoiding associated costs are partial lotteries. Intriguingly, these have been
suggested for several domains independently such as politics and science [26,74]. Finally,
it is important to again note that the institutions which create the proxy should at least
partially be viewed as self-reinforcing power structures (section 5.1.5). This is simply
because they are likely to be primarily designed by current proxy winners (professionals
which have excelled within the current system). Accordingly, we might generally expect
some inertia in societal systems where current proxy winners would decrease their
competitive advantage (or the valuation of their life legacy) by questioning the proxy.
5.2.2 Moral implications
Another simple yet profound implication of the central setup of proxy-based
competition concerns the moral structure of decision problems. So far we have
considered only an egoistic incentive, and an incentive toward an abstract societal goal.
However, individual competitive success is often linked to others, e.g. one’s family, team
or employees. In such cases the ‘egoistic’ action may become a moral imperative. For
instance, a lead investigator may have to weigh a questionable research practice against
the social responsibility of securing funding for her employees. Note, that due to the
inherent ambiguity and temporal gradients between proxy and goal, this will tend to
imply weighing a relatively certain social harm against a relatively uncertain societal
harm. This arguably has direct moral implications. Similarly, a CEO may have to
weigh her responsibility toward her employees against ambiguous environmental or
social damage. Indeed, in practice, securing jobs is frequently invoked as a justification
for morally problematic practices, such as selling arms, damaging the environment, or
economizing on worker safety and well-being. Such cases demonstrate that this is not a
theoretical argument, but a central part of current public moral discourse. The present
theory implies that this type of moral dilemma will tend to be automatically created by
proxy-based competition.
5.2.3 Proxyeconomics across scales - considering markets
So far we have referred to the institutions/mechanisms which create the proxy as single
coherent entities. However, this was an operational choice. In practice these
institutions/mechanisms are often complex and may contain proxy-based competition
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themselves. For instance, the allocation of publication space in high impact journals is
determined through competition between authors but also between journals. Such
nested, or interlocked proxy-based competitions may counteract or amplify corruption,
depending in part on the overlap between informational deficits of the respective proxies.
Generally, increasing the scale and complexity of a system is likely to increase the
number of failure modes and thereby the scope for corruption [46]. However, the market
mechanism arguably represents a system of interlocked competitions which powerfully
prevents many kinds of corruption. For instance, in firms, competition for consumers
counterbalances competition for capital leading to a product price which incorporates
substantial information about consumer valuation as well as production cost.
Furthermore, the distributed, continuous, and direct (incentive compatible) processes of
markets are likely to prevent many sources of information loss. For instance, markets
collect information directly and continuously from consumers rather than from
representatives in preset intervals. Nevertheless, above we have suggested whole market
economies might become proxy-oriented, implying some degree of conservation or
amplification of corruption. Among industrialized nations, this suggestion is supported
by macro-level similarities of the observed phenomena, namely the fact that exponential
economic growth leads to a statistically negligible changes in subjective as well as
objective measures of well-being (e.g. [13, 17,18,21,75]). This is consistent with data
showing that within countries subjective well-being saturates (and sometimes reverses)
with increasing income (e.g. [75, 76]). However, the self-referentiality of proxy
performance in competition suggests that economic growth (proxy-performance) will be
pursued regardless. An evolutionary/neuroscientific understanding of human decision
making suggests how evolutionary mismatch, status seeking behaviors, and/or
preference learning dynamics could be exploited to maintain economic growth without
contributing to human well-being [77]. In the following, we will go through a concrete
example of how evolutionary mismatch and preference learning could be exploited. The
example should furthermore demonstrate how the superior efficiency of market
mechanisms may amplify rather than counteract corruption across scales. Assume
consumers display an excessive preference for high sugar products due to evolutionary
mismatch. Excessive here means, that if they were to make a fully informed decision,
including all aspects of health and long term well-being, they would choose a lower level
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of consumption. Producers may gain an advantage in competition for consumers by
increasing sugar content and obscuring information about negative long term health
consequences. Investors may gain a competitive advantage by investing in producers
performing these two practices, and thus generating higher profits. If we accept the
societal goal of the food-industry, including stakeholders at all levels, as maximizing
consumer welfare, then this implies that corruption at one level entails promoting
corruption at other levels. For instance companies at all levels have an incentive to
obscure detrimental health consequences of high sugar products. This is an example of
synergistic corruption paths for proxy-competitions at multiple scales. Similar perverse
scenarios are plausible for other addictive products (eg. opioids, gambling, etc). We
suspect that obscuring or removing information about detrimental effects of proxy
orientation of a shared proxy represents a frequent basis for amplifying corruption
between interacting proxy-competitions. For instance, a number of industries maintain
an elaborate and costly network of institutions designed to obscure information about
detrimental long term health and environmental consequences of their products [78, 79].
Indeed, it appears this network has been instrumental in preventing action against
global warming. In this context, we want to note that the theory presented here is
closely related to public goods dilemmas, where the socially optimal action (no
defection) corresponds to goal orientation and corruption corresponds to coordination
failure [46,80]. Indeed, the payoff matrix in a public goods (or prisoners) dilemma can
be disaggregated into a goal and a proxy component, showing how the typical payoff
patterns may naturally arise in proxy based competition. The implication is that any
proxy-based competition is likely to create a public goods dilemma to some degree
(again depending on the information captured in the proxy).
5.2.4 Applied proxyeconomics or behavioral economics 2.0
Finally, we want to suggest how the present theory may guide diagnosis and
intervention for real societal systems (applied proxyeconomics). A general strategy
would be to systematically investigate informational idiosynchrasies of proxy-generation
to predict patterns of corruption. Such predictions would allow to diagnose corruption
within societal systems, as well as to design mitigation strategies. For instance, we have
recently leveraged the scientific phenomenon of positve-publication bias to make a range
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of otherwise baffling predictions concerning observed scientific sample sizes [23].
Positive publication bias here is an informational idiosynchracy of the proxy (the
publication record of an author), in that it determines which information is captured
and which is lost. Including this idiosyncrasy into a simple model then allowed to make
predictions about patterns of sample size choices, which could then be compared to
competing goal-orientation accounts as well as empirical data. It has further, recently
been used to explore mitigation strategies [81]. Similarly, we believe decision biases
identified in behavioral economics can be systmatically leveraged to predict patterns of
corruption within societal systems. For instance, excessive proxy-orientation would be
expected to prominently shape consumer choice architectures such that they capitalize
on known decision biases to increase profit [22, 82,83]. Indeed, behavioral economists
emphasize that there is no neutral choice architecture, and suggest that we should
consciously and transparently structure choice architectures to systematicaly nudge
citizens into beneficial behavior [83]. Critics argue that this approach is paternalistic
and should be avoided. The present theory suggests, that in the absence of conscious
and transparent structuring of choice architectures, proxy-measures will be the principal
forces. Accordingly, behavioral economics can be used to derive fine grained, falsifiable
predictions of actual corruption patterns. Prevalent marketing and advertising practices
could be readily analyzed with respect to their implications for proxy- and goal
performance, given known decision biases. For instance, advertisements have recently
been used to analyze behavioral market failure in the payday lending market [84].
Behavioral economics can then be further used to design choice architectures, which
mitigate decision biases and therewith corruption.
5.3 Conclusion
We have outlined a transdisciplinary theory of proxyeconomics, which applies whenever
a societal system employs proxy measures to mediate competition towards an abstract
goal. Our agent-based computational model synthesizes several major insights across
disciplines into a formal framework, suggesting a central role of competition on effort
expenditure, individual utility, selection and cultural evolution. Accordingly, there may
be an optimal level of competition, depending on the complexity of the system and the
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preferences of the participating agents. Furthermore, we have demonstrated, that an
individual-level decision mechanism, which includes an intrinsic goal-oriented motivation
component, can bound the evolution to corrupt practices. More generally, the theory
provides a conceptual and predictive framework to empirically assess the degree to
which actual societal systems may be wastefully or detrimentally oriented towards proxy
measures. Importantly, it includes a mechanistic account of how a system can remain
locked in to a relatively proxy oriented state, even if all individual agents know of, and
value, the actual societal goal. This may help to explain and address diverse phenomena
such as the scientific reproducibility crisis or inaction to the threat of global warming.
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Supporting information
S1 Code Main model code, Python3 code, based on mesa framework.
S2 Code Batch run & figure generation code: Competition, Code to run a
family of models, analyze outputs and create figures, with competiton as the main input
parameter of interest.
S3 Code Batch run & figure generation code: Goal angle, Code to run a
family of models, analyze outputs and create figures, with goal angle as the main input
parameter of interest.
S4 Code Batch run & figure generation code: Goal scale, Code to run a
family of models, analyze outputs and create figures, with goal scale as the main input
parameter of interest.
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S5 Code Batch run & figure generation code: Population size, Code to run
a family of models, analyze outputs and create figures, with the number of agents in the
population as the main input parameter of interest.
S6 Code Batch run & figure generation code: practice mutation
amplitude, Code to run a family of models, analyze outputs and create figures, with
practice mutation amplitude as the main input parameter of interest.
S7 Code Batch run & figure generation code: Selection pressure, Code to
run a family of models, analyze outputs and create figures, with selection pressure as
the main input parameter of interest.
S8 Code Batch run & figure generation code: talent variability, Code to
run a family of models, analyze outputs and create figures, with talent standard
deviation as the main input parameter of interest.
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